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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN D. GLYNN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
MARJORIE DOCTORMAN
DUBIN, aka MARJORIE
DOCTORMAN and DESERET
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
L'OAN ASSOCIATION,
a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 93'88

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal to the Supreme Court from
a judgment of the District Court dismissing plaintiff's complaint seeking partition of real property
held under a joint tenancy deed and granting judgment on defendant's counterclaim quieting title to
said real property in defendant Marjorie Doctorman Dubin. The word defendant used herein shall
refer only to Marjorie Doctorman Dubin unless
otherwise indicated.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about July 22, 1957, defendant and Martin F. Dubin acquired as joint tenants property
known as All of Lot 24, East Millbrook No. 2 in
the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, according
to the plat thereof, recorded in the Office of the
County Recorder of said county. On said date defendant and Martin F. Dubin were husband and
wife and were residing in Salt Lake City while
Martin F. Dubin was interning at Holy Cross Hospital. In December, 1958, defendant filed an action
(cause number 119467) in the District Court of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah wherein she sought
separate maintenance. Later amended complaints
were filed in which defendant sought to obtain a
divorce upon the ground among others, that Martin
F. Dubin was incapable of reproduction and was
further deficient in sexual capabilities. At the time
of the filin,g of the original action for separate
maintenance defendant had not been a resident of
the State of Utah or the County of Salt Lake for
three (3) months preceding the date of the filing
of the complaint. In the Amended Compl~aints the
aforesaid parcel of property was put in issue as a
result of defendant's request that the 'Court enter
an order conveying· to her all of Martin F. Dubin's
·right, title and interest in and to the property, or
in the alternative for an order requiring Martin F.
2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Dubin to m'ake a conveyance of the property to defendant. In said amended complaints defendant alleged that the property was accumulated prior to
her marriage to Martin F. Dubin even though said
complaints alleged that the marri~age occurred March
18, 1956, which was prior to the date of the joint
tenancy deed. Martin F. Dubin filed an Answer
and Cross-Complaint in which he alleged as his
grounds for divorce, among other things, that defendant had failed to ~advise him that she had been
married before and had had said marriage annulled.
Martin F. Dubin further alleged in his cross-complaint that the real property was acquired through
the couple's joint efforts and to their joint benefit an·d
asked the court to award him a just and equitable
share of the property and the income therefrom.
In connection with said action, Martin F.
Dubin, who had been residing in California with
defendant, retained plaintiff herein as his c~alif
ornia legal counsel. Plaintiff thereafter associated
himself with E. R. Callister as Utah counsel and
upon Mr. Callister's appointment to the Supreme
Court with Walter Budge, Esq. also of the Utah Bar
Association. On December 6, 1959, plaintiff and
Dr. Martin F. Dubin flew to Salt Lake City for
trial of the action scheduled for December 8, 1959.
On December 7, 1959, Martin F. Dubin at the instance and request of plaintiff by Quit-Claim Deed
3
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conveyed to plaintiff all of his right, title 'and interest in and to his portion of the joint tenancy property. The consideration for said deed as alleged by
plaintiff was the cancellation of $3,000.00 in legal
fees owing to plaintiff by Martin F. Dubin, the sum
of $100.00 and the execution of a promissory note by
plaintiff in f·avor of Martin F. Dubin for $'5,000.00,
payable $100.00 per month, including interest, commencing January 7, 1960, until principal and interest had been paid. Said deed was recorded on
December 7, 1959.
On the morning of December 8, 1959, plaintiff and Walter E. Budge, Esq. appeared in Judge
Ellett's court as co-counsel for Martin F. Dubin.
On said morning said counsel successfully argued
that the Court was without jurisdiction to proceed
in that at the date of filing of the original complaint for separate maintenance defendant did not
meet the necessary residence requirement. The court
granted ·a dismissal of the action on or about 2:00
p.m. on said date.
Later, on the afternoon of December 8, 1959,
Martin F. Dubin executed at the instance and request of plaintiff another Quit-Claim Deed in favor
of plaintiff to said property in form and substance
more or less identical to the earlier deed. Plaintiff
also executed another similar promissory note in
favor of M'artin F. Dubin and said note and said
quit-clain1 deed were recorded on said date.
4
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Prior to December 7, 1959, defendant had
caused to be 1·ecorded a lis pendens as to S'aid property in which notice was given of the law suit filed
in December, 1958, which suit was dismissed on
De'cember 8, 1959. After the action was dismissed
on December 8, 1959, defendant on the afternoon
of said date caused a second suit (cause number
123578) to be filed and allegedly thereafter caused
another lis pendens to be recorded pertaining to
said real property.
Prior to the dismissal of the first action on
December 8, 1959, plaintiff withdrew as counsel
for Dr. Martin F. Dubin in open court and the
court minutes so indicate. The summons and complaint applicable to the second 'action filed on December 8, 1959, were served upon Martin F. Dubin
some time later in Los Angeles, California. Plaintiff did not represent Martin F. Dubin in said action and an appearance and answer was not made to
said complaint.
On or about the 27th day of January, 1960, a
default hearing was held on the second divorce action at which time defendant was granted a divorce
and in which the decree signed by Honorable Ray
A. Van Cott stated in part:
"Plaintiff be, and she hereby is, awarded
as her sole and separate property free and
clear of any claims of the Defendant the following described real property located in Salt
5
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Lake County, State of Utah, to wit: Lot 24,
East Mill Brook No. 2, according to the official plats of Salt Lake County.''
At the time of the hearing on said default divorce the District Court was not advised that either
of the quit-claim deeds had been executed and recorded even though defendant and both defendant's
counsel, Bernard Rose and Dean Conder, h'ad personal knowledge of such facts.
In May, 1960, plaintiff commenced the instant
action by filing a complaint in which he sought to
partition the aforesaid real property. Defendant
filed an Answer and Counter Claim in which among
other things, defendant admitted that plaintiff's
complaint set forth a cause of action for partition.
The exact nature of defendant's counter-claim is
uncertain although it prays for a judgment quieting title to the real property in defendant.
A trial of the instant action was had before
Honorable Ray A. Van Cott (who had heard the
default divorce case) on November 9, 1960. At the
con!clusion of plaintiff's ease defendant moved for
a dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and for judgment on her counter clain1. Although no evidence
was introduced or presented by defendant the
court granted both of defendant's requests. Before
granting defendant's judgment on her counter claim
the court specificially asked ( T. R. p. 35) defen6
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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dant's counsel whether he was satisfied with the
evidence on the counter claim to which said counsel
replied that he was. This is an appeal from that
decree.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
A. DEFECTIVE PLEADING OF COUNTERCLAIM
OF DEFENDANT.

POINT I.
THE COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANT FAILS
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, AT 25-1-8, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
POINT II.
THE ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANT FAIL TO ALLEGE FACTS SUFFICIENT
TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION TO ESTABLISH A RESULTING TRUST IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT AND ANY EVIDENCE THEREON IS IN VIOLATION OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE.
B. F AlLURE OF PROOF ON
COUYTERCLAIM OR DEFENSE.

DEFENDANT'S

POINT III.
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROVE HER CAUSE
OF ACTION OR DEFENSE UNDER THE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, AT 25-1-8 UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, 1953, OR ANY CAUSE OF ACTION TO
ESTABLISH A RESULTING TRUST.
C. DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING
TO BRING AN ACTION UNDER THE FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCE ACT, AT 25-1-8 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.

POINT IV.
DEFENDANT IS NOT A CREDITOR OR OTHER
PERSON WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UTAH
7
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FRAUDULENT C·ONVEYANCE ACT SINCE SHE WAS
NOT AWARDED SUPPORT OR MAINTENANCE.
D. FAILURE TO FIND ON MATERIAL ISSUES.
POINT V.
THE COURT FAILED TO FIND ON MATERIAL
FACTS OR ISSUES UNDER AN ACTION BASED ON
THE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT AT 25-1-8,
UTAH CODE ANN'OTATED, 1953.
POINT VI.
ASSUMING THAT DEFENDANT'S ANSWER AND
COUNTERCLAIM SET FORTH A CAUSE OF ACTION
TO ESTABLISH A RESULTING TRUST THE COURT
FAILED TO FIND ON MATERIAL FACTS OR ISSUES.
E. EFFECT OF INSTITUTION OF DIVORCE
PROCEEDINGS BY WIFE.
POINT VII.
THE INSTITUTION OF A DIVORCE ACTION
DOES NOT PUT THE PROPERTY INTO THE CUSTODY OF THE COURT AND DOES NOT PREVENT
THE EXERCISE OF THE HUSBAND'S POWERS OVER
THE PROPERTY.
F. ATTORNEY'S FEES AS CONSIDERATION
FOR A CONVEYANCE.
POINT VIII.
A CONVEYANCE MADE TO THE HUSBAND'S
ATTORNEY IN A DIVORCE ACTION IS AS VALID
AS ANY OTHER CONVEYANCE MADE FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION AND WITHOUT INTENT TO
HINDER, DELAY OR DEFRAUD CREDITORS OR
OTHER PERSONS.
G. LIS PENDENS.
P'OINT IX.
THE LIS PENDENS ARE NOT MATERIAL TO A
DETERMINATION OF THE ISSUES.
8
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ARGUMENT
A. DEFECTIVE PLEADING OF COUNTERCLAIM
OF DEFENDANT.
POINT I.
THE COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANT FAILS
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, AT 25-1-8, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.

It is difficult to determine the exact nature of
the counterclaim filed by defendant. The prayer of
the counterclaim requests that defendant's title in
the property be quieted against plaintiff and that
the two quit-claim deeds be vacated and cancelled.
The Pretrial Order states that defendant claims
that the conveyance to plaintiff was in violation of
the Fraudulent Conveyance Act, at 25-1-8 Utah
Code Annotated, 1953. Assuming that the counterclaim was intended to be framed under said code
section, it is obvious that the counterclaim does not
set forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. Said code section provides in pertinent part:
"Every conveyance or assignment in writing or otherwise ... made with the intent to
delay, hinder or defraud creditors, or other
persons, of their lawful suits, damages, forfeitures, debts or demands ... shall be void."
Section 25-1-13 of said Act further provides:
"The provisions of this chapter shall not
be construed to affect or impair the title of
a purchaser for a valu·able consideration, unless it appears that such purchaser had previous notice of the fraudulent intent of his
9
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immediate grantor, or of the fraud rendering void the title of such grantor."
Section 25-1-7 of said Act further provides
that "·actual intent" to hinder, delay or defraud
creditors is necessary in order to invoke the provisions of said Act in point herein. Smith, et al v.
Edw.ards, Utah 1932, ________________________ , states:
"And the r~tle is that the facts upon which
fraud is predicated must be specifically pleaded. A mere general averment of fraud is nothing more than the averment of a conclusion,
and will not suffice. It presents no issue for
trial, and is bad on demurrer. Such an averment not only renders the bill or complaint
demurrable but it will not even sustain a decree." (Emphasis supplied)

In Smith v. Edu~ards, supra, the court pointed
out that the complaint was further deficient in that
there was no allegation of the amount of the indebtedness, the value of the land conveyed, nor the value
of assets remaining after the conYeyance. In the
instant case essential elements of the cause of action
are not alleged. There is no allegation that Martin
F. Dubin made the conveyance ''with the intent to
delay, hinder or defraud creditors or other persons . . . " as required by the code section. Paragraph 5 of defendant's counterclaim alleges that
both .deeds were executed, recorded and delivered
with the calculated purpose by plaintiff herein and
Martin F. Dubin "to obstruct orderly judicial pro10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cedure as it might be determined in the case of
Dubin v. Dttbin, file number 123578, which was
filed on December 8, 1959, and prior to the execution, delivery and recordation of the quit-cl~aim deed
which is the basis for plaintiff's complaint." The
obstruction of "orderly judicial procedure" is not
the same as the required pleading of an intent "to
delay, hinder or defraud creditors or other persons."
It should also be noted that it is claimed that the
deed of December 7, 1959 (under which pl!aintiff
claims) was executed for the purpose of obstructing
orderly judicial procedure in action number 12357'8
which action was not even filed until the next day
and which plaintiff and Martin F. Dubin had no
way of knowing would be in existence on said date!
Suffice it to say th~at the counter claim fails to allege
the required element of fraudulent intent on the
part of Martin F. Dubin. Likewise there is no allegation that plaintiff "had previous notice of the
fraudulent intent of his immediate grantor or of
the fraud rendering void the title of such grantor."
In Heidelberg v. Smith, 1959, 214 Ga. 785, 107 SE
2d 844, it is stated: "In the present case, it is not
alleged that the defendant had actual notice or reasonable grounds to suspect fraudulent intent on the
part of the husband. The petition therefore, failed
to allege a cattse of action based on fraud" (emphasis
supplied). Defendant's allegation that plaintiff had
11
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knowledge of the "claims of Defendant Marjorie D.
Dubin" is not capable of being construed as an ·allegation that plaintiff had notice of the fraudulent
intent of Martin F. Dubin. It is immaterial whether
or not plaintiff knew of the "claims" of Marjorie D.
Dubin if (1) in fact Martin F. Dubin did not have
the requisite "fraudulent intent;" or ( 2) if he did
have such intent plaintiff did not have knowledge of
the said intent of Martin F. Dubin. Knowledge of
the "'claims" might be considered as one factor in
determining whether or not Martin F. Dubin had
such fraudulent intent, but mere knowledge of the
claims does not per se constitute a pleading of ·a
fraudulent intent.
Furthermore, the counterclaim fails to state
that defendant is a "creditor" or "other person"
within the meaning of the Act. This point will be
discussed in detail under a point hereinafter.
POINT II.
THE ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANT FAIL TO ALLEGE FACTS SUFFICIENT
TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION TO ESTABLISH A RE8ULTING TRUST IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT AND ANY EVIDENCE THEREON IS IN ·vi·OLATION OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE.

The pleadings !and Pretrial Order are most confusing as to the defendant's theory upon which her
defenses or claims are based. Paragraph 9 of the
main Pretrial Order states that defendant contented
that the ·conveyance to plaintiff was fraudulent be12
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cause ''it was an effort to convey property that belonged to the defendant" and further states that the
court held that since the defendant 'admits that the
property is held in joint tenancy that defendant had
made a gift of it to the grantor and that such was
no defense. Later the Pretrial Judge, Honorable
Joseph G. Jeppson, allowed paragraph 9 to be amended to read that plaintiff received property from
Martin F. Dubin which defendant alleges that although title was held in joint tenancy that she was
the equitable owner of the entire property. The Pretrial judge, however, stated in said Amended Pretrial order
"Although the court has grave doubt
about the validity of the contention, it was
left for the trial court to determine whether
or not it amounts to a defense." (Emphasis
supplied)
It is axiomatic that a resulting trust arises
whfn there is a transfer of property under circumstances showing th~at the transferee was not inten0ed to take the beneficial interest. Restatement
Truc;ts, Section 404. It has been termed an "intention enforcing" trust to distinguish it from the other
type of implied trust, the constructive or "fraud
rectifying" trust. There is no claim that fraud was
involved when the property was taken in joint tenancy. Likewise, there are no allegations in defendant's answer or counterclaim in which it is claimed
13
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1hat it was intended at the time of the creation of
the joint tenancy that defendant was to be the beneficiq,l owner of the entire property. InNeill v. Royce,
Ut~h, 120 P. 2d 327 it is stated:
·
"However, at all times where an expressed intention appeared on the face of the instrument indicating a joint tenancy, equity
would allow the joint tenancy to prevail."
In Lundgreen v. Lundgreen, Utah, 184 P. 2d
670 it is stated:
"The most widely accepted view is that
the property passes as a gift inter vivos, provided there is donative intent and delivery.
Christensen v. Ogden State Bank, 75 Utah
4 78, 286 p. 638."
''Where however, the parties h·ave entered
into and expressed a writing a complete agreement which is clear as to intent and purpose
of the deposit, the intent so expressed will be
given effect unless the instrument is successfully attacked for fraud, mistake, incapacity,
or other infirmity, or unless it is shown by
"clear and convincing proof" that the parties
intended to have a different effect from that
expressed.''
It is therefore, apparent that the joint tenancy
deed fron1 defendant to Martin F. Dubin was ambiguous and may not be varied by parol evidence. In
Anderson v. Cercone, 180 Pac. 586, 588, Utah, it
is stated:
''We are not unmindful of the rule that
to establish a resulting trust ... in favor of
14
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one who furnished purchase money, public
policy and the safety and security of titles to
re'al estate, demand that the proof be scrutinized with great caution, and that it be clear,
definite, unequivocal, and conclusive. (Citing
Chambers v. Emery, 13 Utah 374, 45 Pac.
192)"
In the instant case the pleadings are completely
devoid of any allegations upon which a resulting
trust can be predicated. In 13 Cal. Jur. 2d Section 13
Cotenancy, P. 299 it is said:
"Extraneous Matter to Change Character where the effect of the agreement is to
create a joint estate extraneous evidence cannot be introduced to change the terms or legal
effect of the agreement (Gurnsey Estate, 177
C. 211 170 P. 402). Hence, oral declarations
of the joint tenants may not be shown to establish a different estate. Nor is the former
character of the property in such a case of
'any consequence to alter the declaration of it
as joint tenancy property (Kennedy vs. lVIcMurray, 169 C. 287, 146 P. 647)."
B. FAILURE OF PROOF ON DEFENDANT'S
COU .VTERCLAIM OR DEFENSE.

POINT III.
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROVE HER ALLEGED
CAUSE OF ACTION OR DEFENSE UNDER THE
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, AT 25-1-8 UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, OR ANY CAUSE OF ACTION TO ESTABLISH A RESULTING TRUST.

~

In equity cases, such as the instant case, the
Supreme Court has authority to review the evidence
and reYerse the judgment on the facts. Art. VIII,
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Section 9, Utah Constitution. Givan vs. Lambeth,
May, 1960, Utah, 351, P. 2d 959, 10 Utah 2nd, 287.
The party seeking to set aside a conveyance on the
ground of fraud has the burden of proving a fraudulent conveyance, which requires clear and convincing proof. Barker vs. Durham, Utah, 1959, 342 P.
2d, 867, 9 Utah 2d 244. It is a maxim of our law
that honesty is presumed. The burden of proving
fraud is on the party alleging it, and it is a heavy
burden. Circumstances which are merely suspicious
are not enough to render a conveyance fraudulent.
All of the elements must be supported by very substantial proofs. Columbia lnternatioool Corporation
vs. Perry, 344 P. 2d 509.
Even if it be assumed that a cause of action
was pleaded under the Fraudulent Conveyance Act
or to establish a resulting trust, the record is devoid
of evidence to support either cause of action. As
hereinafter discussed, certain findings necessary to
support either action were not made. However, the
findings that were m~ade by the trial court are not
supported by substantial evidence and in most cases
are not supported by any evidence.
Finding No. 4 states in part that Exhibit No.
4, a lis pendens applicable to Cause No. 123578 (the
second divorce action filed December 8, 1959) was
recorded at 1 :45 P.M. on December 8, 1959. There
was no competent evidence presented !as to the re16
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cording time. Plaintiff stipulated to the admission
of said exhibit but he specifically stated that he was
not stipulating to the recording time since it appeared on its face to have been altered ( T .R. p. 30).
No evidence was put on by defendant to verify the
recording time. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint
that the recording time was 11:45 A.M. which would
be before the time when the complaint mentioned
in the lis pendens was filed. This claim by plaintiff was based upon his personal inspection of the
files in the County Recorder's office on December
8, 1959.
The findings of the trial court (Finding No. 4)
that the $12,000.00 down payment was paid from
the funds of the defendant which she acquired before her marri'age and that Martin F. Dubin had
made no payments in connection with said property
is irrelevant and there is no substantial evidence or
any evidence to support such findings. It was admitted in the pleadings that the property was taken
by defendant and Martin F. Dubin in joint ten'ancy.
There was no allegation of any fraud connected
with the creation of such joint tenancy and there
was no allegation that the joint tenancy deed ,did
not accurately set forth the intention of the parties
when said deed was executed. It was not until several weeks before the trial of the instant action before defendant claimed that she was the equitable
17
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owner of the property. This claim was embodied in
paragraph 9 of the Amended Pre-Trial Order but,
significantly, the entire pleadings are devoid of any
facts upon which such a conclusion can be based.
The trial court at the Pre-Trial expressed "grave
doubt about the validity of this contention." As heretofore discussed to allow evidence to be presented
on this contention does violence to the p·arol evidence
rule. However, we need not reach that point since
there was no competent evidence presented to establish and prove such contention. It is to be noted that
defendant in her amended complaint in the first
divorce action (Civil No. 119467), claimed in paragraph 5 that plaintiff accumulated the real property prior to her marriage to Martin F. Dubin,
while the Pre-Trial order in said action states (p. 2)
that she claims the $12,000.00 was from earnings
she made during her marri'age to Martin F. Dubin.
She further claimed in said Pre-Trial Order that she
"contributed" said $12,000.00 to build up an equity
in the home. In her Answer to Interrogatory #15
in Cause No. 119467 she cl'aimed that the monies
were accumulated prior to her marriage to Martin
F. Dubin. Where the p'arties have expressed in writing a complete argreement which is clear as to intent and purposes, the intent so expressed will be
given effect unless the instrument is successfully
attacked for fraud, 1nistake, incapacity, or other
infirmity, or unless it is shown by clear and convinc18
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ing proof that the parties intended the instrument
to have a different effect from th'at expressed. Neill
vs. Royce, 120 P. 2d 327, Utah. And it cannot be
said that defendant did not present all the evidence
at her disposal to establish such ownership. At the
trial the Court asked defendant's counsel, Dean
Conder, " Are you satisfied with the evidence on
your counterclaim?" Mr. Conder replied: "I 'am,
your honor." (T. R. p. 35)
Finding No. 2 states that defendant claimed
in the suit filed in December, 1959, all of the right,
title and interest in and to the real property. She did
not claim that she owned all of the property or that
she had a presently existing right to the property,
or that the original joint tenancy deed was void.
Rather, her complaint in both divorce actions merely alleged the circumstances surrounding the creation of the joint tenancy. Nowhere was it claimed
in the divorce actions that she was the complete
owner of the property. Rather, she sought to invoke
the court's discretion to award to her all of the property as a result of the divorce action. This is quite
different than saying that she claimed a "right"
to the property above and beyond what the court
might do with the property in resolving a division
of property. In her divorce action she, in one instance, claimed that she "contributed" the property
as hereinabove stated. The testimony of the plain19
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tiff in the instant action was not to effect that he
knew that defendant claimed a "right" to all of the
property. His testimony dealt with his knowledge
as to what defendant claimed were the circumstances
surrounding the creation of the joint tenan·cy.
C. DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING
TO BRING AN ACTION UNDER THE FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCE ACT, AT 25-1-8 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
POINT IV.
DEFENDANT IS NOT A CREDITOR OR OTHER
PERSON WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UTAH
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT SINCE SHE WAS
NOT AWARDED SUPPORT OR MAINTENANCE.

There is ·a scarcity of Utah case authority construing the meaning of the words "creditor" or
"other person" as used in the Fraudulent Conveyance Act. At Common Law there was a split of authority as to whether or not a wife or child by virtue
of right to support could maintain an action to set
aside a fraudulent conveyance without reducing the
claim to judgment. vVith the adoption of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act the claim of the
creditor or other person can be matured, unmatured,
liquidated, unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent. Hozcever, there still must be a "claim" of some
type. In the instant case it is to be noted, significantly, that the counterclain1 was not filed until after
the divorce action had been decided. If we assume
that Utah law recognizes a "claim" in the wife due
20
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to her right to support or maintenance it is then
necessary to ascertain whether or not defendant at
the time of the filing of her counterclaim had such
a "claim" to support or maintenance. It is obvious
from the decree entered in the second divorce action
(cause No. 123578) that defendant was not awarded
alimony or support as m'aintenance. She was granted
a divorce, her maiden name was restored and she
was awarded as her sole and separate property free
and clear of any claims of the ,defendant Martin F.
D~tbin in the described property. All she was awarded was her interest o'f record in one-half of the property free and clear of the claims of Martin F.
Dubin. Plaintiff herein was not a party defendant
to s'aid divorce action even though under case authority defendant herein could have made plaintiff
herein a party. He could not have his rights affected
in his absence. It is to be noted that defendant and
her two attorneys had personal knowledge of the
fact th~at Martin F. Dubin had conveyed his interest in the property to plaintiff herein, but at the
trial of the divorce action they chose to remain silent
on this point when the property was being discussed
and was at issue by the court. In fact an estoppel
n1ay well exist against defendant to now 'assert her
alleged claims after once having deceived the court
into a mistaken belief as to the status of the legal
title to the property. A case squarely in point is
21
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Adamson v. Adamson, 55 Utah 544, 188 Pac. 635,
in which proceedings for divorce were not contested
and a decree was entered in favor of the wife. There
was no alimony awarded and no child support. Prior
to the divorce action the husband and wife were
joint owners of real property. In the action seeking
to set aside 'a conveyance made by the husband of
his interest to his father just before the commencement of the divorce action, the wife alleged that
conveyance was fraudulent in that it was made to
defraud her of some $2,300 owing to her by the
husband and of any alimony th'at might be awarded
to her by the court. The property had a value of
$2,500 and it was conveyed to the husband's father
for $1,250, payable $250.00 in cash and in two installment p·ayments of $500 each over a two year
period. The lower court held against the wife, stating that the complaint was insufficient as a creditor's bill since it didn't show that the wife had procured a judgment or that the husband was insolvent.
The appellate court affirmed, citing Nielson v. Nielson, 30 Utah 391, 85 Pac. 429 and stating
"Under the authority aboYe cited the husband had the right to sell his interest subject
only to his wife's one-third interest in case
she continued to be his wife and survived
him."
The instant case is even stronger in that Martin
F. Dubin did not owe his wife any 1noney at the
22
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time of the conveyance as in the Ad,amson case and
he did not owe or was he obligated to pay his wife
alimony after his wife's divorce decree was granted.
In T~tlly Y. T~tlly, 137 C 60, 69 P. 700 and
Clopton v. Clopton, 162 C 27, 121 P. 720, it is said:
"It is only to the extent that the wife's
right to s·upport h'as been affected by the
transfer that she has any legal ground of complaint entitling her to avoid the transfer."
(Emphasis supplied)
It is to be noted that in the Clopton case there
was no consideration for the transfer. In M~trray v.
M~trray, 115 C 266, 47 P. 37 it is held that even a
fraudulent transfer should not be set aside any further than is necessary to secure the maintenance
allowed the wife by the court and any property not
needed for such security should be restored to the
transferee. See also Huellmantel v. H~tellmantel, 124
C 583, 57 P. 582 where there was a fraudulent
transfer but the court held that the interest of the
grantee may be adjudged to be subject only to the
wife's lien for alimony, counsel fees, and legitimate
costs.
In the instant case it is the position of plaintiff
that the conveyance was not fraudulent but that
under the facts of the instant case it would not make
any difference in any event due to the fact that at
the time of defendant't counterclaim she was not a
"creditor" or "other person" since there was no
23
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"claim" of any type that she might or could assert
against Martin F. Dubin. When she failed to secure
alimony or support any claim that she might have
had was destroyed. In Parker v. Parker, 148 Ga.
196, 96 SE 211 it was held that a plaintiff wife's
right to have a conveyance cancelled is dependant
on her right to a judgment for alimony. In Arteaga
v. Arteaga, 169 Ga. 59'5, 151 SE 5 it was held that
since the wife couldn't get a decree for alimony
(the husband had died) she couldn't set ,aside a
fraudulent conveyance. See also Draper v. Draper,
68 Ill. 17, where it was held that a conveyance by
the husband to his brother pendente lite, in order
to defraud his wife in her claim or alimony,
was fraudulent only to the extent of the claim
for alimony, and that it was error to set aside the
conveyance. In Sorrells v. Sorrells, 162 Ga. 734, 134
SE 76 an action for divorce was filed and then there
was a reconciliation. Husband then died and wife
sought to set aside a conveyance because it was allegedly in fraud of her claim for alimony. The court
held that since de,ath of husband made award of alimony impossible equity has no jurisdiction or power
to cancel the deed. See also ll'"allace v. llrallace, 189
Ga. 220, 5 SE 2d 580 where it was held that the
wife was not a "creditor" if the husband wasn't
in default in alin1ony payments. In the instant case
no alimony payments are possible. For a general
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discussion of the wife's right to maintenance or alitnony as within protection or rule avoiding conveyances or transfers in fraud of creditors or persons
to whom maker is under a legal liability. See annotation at 79 ALR 421.
D.

FAILURE TO FIND ON MATERIAL ISSUES.

POINT V.
THE COURT FAILED TO FIND ON MATERIAL
FACTS OR ISSUES UNDER AN ACTION BASED ON
THE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT AT 25-1-8,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 19'53.

It is reversible error for the court to fail to
make findings of fact on material issues. Under
the Fraudulent Conveyance Act certain essential
elements must be found. In the instant case the following findings were not made by the court :

!,·.

[

lr.

;:
1,,

1. That Martin F. Dubin did or did not h~ave
a fraudulent intent to delay, hinder or defraud
creditors or other persons when the conveyance was
1nade.
2. That defendant was or was not a creditor
or other person under said act.
3. That the conveyance to plaintiff was or was
not for a fair consideration as defined at 25-1-3,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
4. That plaintiff was or was not a purchaser
for a valuable consideration within the meaning of
25-1-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
25
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5. That plaintiff did or did not have notice
of the fraudulent intent of his grantor or of the
fraud rendering void the title of such grantor.
6.

The value of the land conveyed.

7. The value of the consideration paid to Martin F. Dubin by pl'aintiff.
These finding were not made even though defendant's counsel stated in open court that he was
satisfied with the evidence.
POINT VI.
ASSUMING THAT DEFENDANT'S ANSWER AND
COUNTERCLAIM SET FORTH A CAUSE OF ACTION
TO ESTABLISH A RESULTING TRUST THE COURT
FAILED TO FIND ON MATERIAL FACTS OR ISSUES.

As heretofore stated an action to establish aresulting trust has been called an "intention enforcing" cause of action. In the instant case the court
failed to make the following findings :
1. That at the time of the execution of the
joint tenancy deed the parties did or did not intend
to create a joint tenancy with all its incidents of
ownership.
2. What was the intention of the parties when
the joint tenancy deed was executed.
3. What portion, if any, of the interest in the
land is subject to a resulting trust.
4. What were the respective contributions of
the p'arties to the consideration paid for the property.
26
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E. EFFECT OF INSTITUTION
PROCEEDING BY lVIFE.

OF

DIT?ORCE

POINT VII.
THE INSTITUTION OF A DIVORCE ACTION
DOES NOT PUT THE PROPERTY INTO THE CUSTODY OF THE COURT AND DOES NOT PREVENT
THE EXERCISE OF THE HUSBAND'S POWERS OVER
THE PROPERTY.
In the leading case of S1Jn Insur~ance Co. v.

White, 123 C 196, 55 P. 902 it was held that the
pendency of proceedings for divorce does not of itself interrupt the exercise of the husband's power
of disposition of the community property or of his
separate property though he is held to good faith.
The Sun case cites Lord v. Haugh, 43 Cal. 581 and
states:
"The pendency of proceedings for divorce does not of itself interrupt the exercise
of the husband's powers. The property does
not come into the custody of the court by institution of the suit. The husband has still
the control of it and full power of disposition of it. He is held to equ'al good faith in all
transactions relating to it :as before the commencement of the action." (Emphasis supplied)
1._

See also Estate of Harris, 9 C 2d 649, 659 where
it is stated:
"It is one of the incidents of a joint tenancy that either joint tenant may convey his
separate estate by way of gift or otherwise
without the approval or consent of his other
joint tenant and upon such conveyance the
27
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joint tenancy is terminated. (Delaney v. Delaney, 216 Cal. 23, 13 P. 2d 513)"
See also Adamson v. Adamson, 55 Utah 544 188
Pac. 635 'and Nielson v. Nielson, 30 Utah 391, 85
Pac. 429 wherein it is held that the husband had
the right to sell his interest subject only to his wife's
one third interest in case she continued to be his
wife and survived him.
F. ATTORNEY'S FEES
FOR A CONVEYANCE.

AS

CONSIDERATION

POINT VIII.
A CONVEYANCE MADE TO THE HUSBAND'S
ATTORNEY IN A DIVORCE ACTION IS AS VALID
AS ANY OTHER CONVEYANCE MADE FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION AND \VITHOUT INTENT TO
HINDER, DELAY OR DEFRAUD CREDITORS OR
OTHER PERSONS.

In the instant case the trial court suffered
under the misapprehension that in order for plaintiff to prevail he must be "innocent of her ( defendant) rights" (T. R. p. 34). The "right" the trial
judge made reference to was defined by him 'as "a
right to have this property disposed of in the divorce action" ( T. R. p. 34). The court did not bother
to make a determination as to whether or not the
plaintiff's grantor had a fraudulent intent or whether or 11ot plaintiff had knowledge of such fraudulent intent. The court likewise was not concerned
as to whether or not the consideration paid by plaintiff to his grantor was fair. Apparently, the trial
28
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cot1rt's v1ew of the fraudulent conveyance statute
is that if a purchaser knows that his grantor is being divorced and knows that the wife is seeking an
interest the property that the conveyance to such
purchaser is void and it is immaterial that: ( 1 )
there was valuable and fair consideration for the
tr·ansfer (2) there was no fraudulent intent by the
grantor (3) there was no knowledge by grantee of
'any fraudulent intent of his grantor, or ( 4) that
the wife may or may not be a "creditor" or "other
person" under the statute. By no stretch of the
imagination can it be said that the state of the law
is as held by the trial court. Under the theory advanced by the trial court no creditor or potential
creditor of the husband could ever de'al effectively
with the husband if such creditor knew of the divorce action. In the instant case plaintiff had rendered approximately one and one-hal'f years legal
services to his grantor in connection with the involved and complex divorce actions and in connection with his grantor's business ~and practice in
California. The grantor testified that it was agreed
that said fee was reasonably worth '$3,000.00 and
that plaintiff was the one who requested the conveyance. Can it be said that plaintiff should be discriminated against as a creditor merely because he
happens to be grantor's attorney and has been willing to permit the amount of the bill for legal services
29
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to increase substantially because his grantor is just
commencing the practice of medicine? At the trial
plaintiff attempted to point out to the court that
there were many cases (which plaintiff was ready
to cite) in which a conveyance to an attorney who
represented a grantor in a divorce action was held
not fraudulent and entirely proper. Upon attempting to do so the court showed its prejudice and failure to understand the principles of the Fraudulent
Conveyance Act when the court stated without any
justification: (T.R. p. 35)
"THE COURT: If you were a member of
this Bar, I would recommend to the Disciplin·ary Commission that you be brought before
them for discipline. That is what I would do
as far as the case is concerned, but being a
member of the State of California Bar we are
not concerned with your law practice. I would
suggest as far as you are concerned, your
ethical morals are pretty low."
It is to be noted that the very judge making
said statement is the same judge who apparently was
not at all concerned that at the defendant's divorce
trial, over which he presided, two attorneys representing defendant, as officers of the court failed to
disclose the material fact that the interest of Martin F. Dubin as a joint tenant in the property had
been previously quit-claimed to plain tiff! Normally
matters such as the court's remarks to plaintiff
would not be included in a brief such as this, but
30
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in view of the seriousness and severity of the court's
comments and the complete lack of found'ation (based
upon applicable law) the plaintiff as a member of
the Bar and a proud member of his profession feels
that it is necessary to call the matter to the court's
attention.
There are innumerable cases in which a conveyance made to an attorney has been held entirely
proper. In point is the following quotation from 16
Cal. J ur. 2d Section 250 Divorce and Separation:
"In the absence of actual fraud, a transfer by 'a husband to a creditor in consideration of the extinguishment of an antecedent indebtedness is not an unlawful preference that can be set aside by the wife
seeking divorce.''
For 'an excellent annotation discussing attorneys fees as affecting conveyance for value and consideration see 45 ALR 2d 514. In Thiess v. Thiess,
' was
111 Nebraska 805, 198 NW 151 a mortgage
given to attorneys for services to be performed and
at that time performed. The attorneys h'ad appeared
twice in the Superior Court in the divorce action
and twice in the district court. The fees were held to
be in an amount not exceeding a reasonable fee for
services which might reasonably be anticipated. The
court upheld the validity of the mortgage citing
Farmers' and Merch.ants' Bank v. Mosher, 63 Nebraska 130, 88 NW 552, where it is stated:
31
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"An insolvent debtor has the right to employ attorneys to defend his estate and himself and to transfer his property in payment
of such contemplated services, provided it is
done in good faith and the property transferred does not exceed a reason'able fee for
the service which might be reasonably anticipated.''
In the instant case the conveyance was for past
services, cash and the execution of a promissory note
for $5,000.00 which plaintiff and his grantor testified together approximated one-half of the equity
defendant and plaintiff's grantor had in the real
property. The mortgage was also assumed. For other
cases upholding conveyances involving attorney's
fees see: Reina v. Erossarret, 90 Cal. App. 2d 1, 203
P. 2d 72; Morroq~tin v. Barriall, 345 P. 2d 30, 175
Cal. App. 2d 540 and Reinheimer v. Rhedans, 327
SW 2d 823 (1959). See also Hedden v. Waldeck, 9
Cal. 2d 631, 72 Pac. 2d 114 wherein a deed conveying real property to an attorney in payment for
services was upheld against the contention that the
purpose of the transfer was to prevent collection of
a judgment subsequently obtained in a suit against
the grantor pending at the time of transfer.
Plaintiff calls the court's attention that in
Adamson v. Adamson, Utah, 55 Utah 544, 188 Pac.
635, a divorce action, the grantee (father of the
husband) knew of the divorce action and paid
$1,250, one-half the value of the property for a
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I

one-half interest therein, payable $250 in cash and
rem'ainder in two installments of $500 during a
two year ·period. The court said that the installment
method of payment was proper. The court's attention is also called to the leading case of Sun I ns~tr
ance Co. v. White, 123 C 196, 55 P. 902 in which a
lis pendens was filed and in which the pl'aintiff
grantee had actual notice of the divorce action. The
conveyance was there upheld.
In Lewis v. Lewis, 1954, 210 Ga. 330, 80 SE
2d 312, a husband conveyed a house and lot to his
attorney for $500 ~attorney's fees, a note for $700
and assumption of loan against the property. The
court therein stated: "As to whether the defendant
Graham knew or had reasonable ground to suspect
the fraudulent intention of the husband - this issue
likewise was one for the jury. The fact that the conveyance was one from a client to his attorney does
not of itself show that the transaction was fraudulent, but such a transaction was subject to a more
careful scrutiny than one between strangers." The
court pointed out that the jury could consider the
fact that the attorney didn't look at the premises
or make an independent examination of the value
of the husband's equity. In the instant case plaintiff
and his grantor testified that they both inspected
the property and visited Deseret Federal Savings
and Loan Association to determine the amount still
owing on the mortgage.
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See also the recent Utah case of Givan v. Lambeth, Utah, May, 1960, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P. 2d
959, wherein Chief Justice Crockett states that the
evidence can be reviewed by the Supreme Court and
in which a transaction between close relatives was
upheld.
G.

LIS PENDENS.

POINT IX.
THE LIS PENDENS ARE NOT MATERIAL TO A
DETERMINATION OF THE ISSUES.

It is the position of plaintiff that the lis pendens are not materi~al to a determination of the issues of the case since plaintiff stipulated in open
court that he had full knowledge of the pleadings in
the first action. As attorney of record along with E.
R. Callister and then Walter Budge plaintiff knew
full well the cl'aims asserted by defendant. However, under the case authority herein cited such
knowledge is immaterial if in fact the conveyance
was made without fraudulent intent on the part of
the grantor or without knowledge by grantee of the
fraudulent intent of his grantor. Mere knowledge of
the claims of defend·ant is not tantamount to a finding that the grantor had a fraudulent intent or that
grantee had knowledge of such fraudulent intent.
True, such knowledge of defendant's claims may be
a factor to be considered in determining intent but
such knowledge per se is not tantamount to fraudulent intent.
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It is to be noted, however, that the deed of
December 7, 1959, under which plaintiff claims his
interest was executed, delivered and recorded prior
to the lis pendens filed on December 8, 1959. The
earlier lis pendens is ineffective since the action was
dismissed. It has been held that where the action
is not prosecuted to judgment but instead is settled
or dismissed, the subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer is unaffected by the lis pendens, for he takes
subject only to a judgment concerning the title.
Alson v. Corrnvell, (1933) 134 CA 419, 427, 25 P.
2d 879; Harris v. Whittier B. & L. Association
(1936) 18 CA 2d 260, 266, 63 P. 2d 840.
The lis pendens is incidental to the action in
which it is filed, and is ineffective to give notice
of a future, though similar action. Gar·cia v. Pinhe?~o, ( 1937) 22 CA 2d 194, 70 P. 2d 675.

CONCLUSION

The trial court has erred in ·a number of particulars, anyone of which require a reversal and a
judgment in favor of plaintiff on his complaint for
partition of real property and an 'accounting of rental income. The judgment should be reversed with
judgment in favor of plaintiff and a retrial should
not be ordered since defendant stated in court that
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she was satisfied with the evidence presented on her
counterclaim. A retrial will cause hardship on plaintiff due to his residence outside the State of Utah.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN D. GLYNN
In Propria Persona
9171 Wilshire Boulevard
Beverly Hills, California
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